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I.  INTRODUCTION 
  
 A well-known cliché1 came to life when “[t]he pope’s butler was 
convicted . . . of stealing the pontiff’s private documents and leaking them to 
a journalist . . . .”2  His lawyer’s unsuccessful argument—that taking “only 
photocopies, not original documents” should not be criminal3—prompted this 
paper. 
 When tangible property is taken, owners retain nothing.  When 
documents or equivalents are duplicated, however, even if owners retain 
originals, they suffer loss of control and may lose substantial present and 
potential advantages, not necessarily economic.  Civil redress for such losses 
has therefore long been available through copyright and trade secret laws.  
Indeed, it has often been available when injuries occasioned by unauthorized 
                                            
 * Mr. Field, an unaffiliated scholar, was a founding faculty member of Franklin Pierce Law Center, 
as well as the founding Editor-in-Chief of RISK, the predecessor of the University of New Hampshire Law 
Review.  As a full-time professor, he taught intellectual property courses for more than 40 years.  He 
continues as the featured op-ed columnist of iP Frontline.  Nearly 100 of his columns are linked from 
http://www.ipfrontline.com/aboutsource.aspx?editorid=244 (visited June 10, 2013). 
 1. “The butler did it” has been called “the biggest cliché in mystery writing” and is “commonly 
attributed to Mary Roberts Rinehart.  Her otherwise forgettable 1930 novel . . . in which the butler actually 
is the villain.” Why do we think the butler did it?, THE GUARDIAN, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/booksblog/2010/dec/09/why-we-think-the-butler-did-it (last visited Dec. 
9, 2012). 
 2. See Nicole Winfield, Pope’s butler convicted in leaks, given 18 months (Oct. 6, 2012), 
http://news.yahoo.com/popes-butler-convicted-leaks-given-18-months-102852754.html (last visited Nov. 
24, 2012). 
 3. Id. 
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reproduction seem unrelated to goals traditionally advanced by either body of 
law.4  Thus, the way information is expressed may be protected by copyright 
and, until published, if it otherwise qualifies, information as such may also 
enjoy trade secret protection.5 
 When civil remedies are inadequate to deter theft and vindicate interests 
of owners and the public, civil remedies can be augmented with criminal 
penalties.6  Differences between tangibles and intangibles, however, are often 
seen to warrant different prosecutorial requirements and penalties. 
 The second part of this paper explains how federal courts, recognizing 
those differences, have come to find the National Stolen Property Act 
(“NSPA”)7 inapplicable to theft of at least some intangibles.  Ones addressed 
there fall within the scope of the Federal Copyright Act (“FCA”)8 and the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”).9 
 State copyright jurisdiction is mostly preempted,10 so the third part of the 
paper focuses on state trade secret laws.  It begins by noting that sources of 
civil trade secret law are nearly uniform whereas criminal law varies in 
important respects.  Three noteworthy opinions then illustrate diverse state 
approaches.  In one, the highest court in Massachusetts refuses to subject 
intangible property theft to provisions designed for tangible property.11  In a 
second, an intermediate Florida appellate court endorses penalties for theft of 
both intangibles and tangibles where the overwhelming bulk of value resided 
in the former and the latter was subject to penalties three times larger.12  In 
the third opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirms conviction for 
theft of intangibles in circumstances very much akin to those of concern to 
the Vatican tribunal in that only copies were stolen.13  
 The paper concludes, first, by echoing a suggestion that lack of 
uniformity in state law justifies federal penalties and expanded jurisdiction.14  
It also advocates more uniformity and better articulation of the subject matter 
                                            
 4. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (alleging infringement of copyright in two sets of works and misappropriation of trade 
secrets in one set “which it alleges has been the subject of elaborate security measures”). 
 5. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (West 2012) with 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (West 2012). Only until 
information is published, is trade secret protection available for subject matter within the § 102(b) 
exclusion.  Thus, in U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov III), 676 F.3d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2012), as discussed 
below, computer code that was protected by copyright also qualified for trade secret protection. 
 6. See, e.g., Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 469 (2011). 
 7. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (West 2012). 
 8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (West 2012). 
 9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (West 2012). 
 10. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (West 2012). 
 11. Commonwealth v. Yourawski, 425 N.E.2d 298 (Mass.1981). 
 12. Taborsky v. State, 659 So.2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
 13. State v. Nelson, 842 A.2d 83 (N.H. 2004). 
 14. See Peter J.G. Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Thefts Under Federal Law, 22 PEPP. L. 
REV. 59, 96 (1994). 
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contemplated by the term “intangibles” in, for example, the Model Penal 
Code.15  Finally, the paper argues that even when tangibles such as media are 
taken, courts should, for example, not base their value on the value of its 
intangible contents. 
 
II.  FEDERAL LAW 
A. Copyrights 
  
 The FCA contains a key provision, unfortunately buried deeply: 
 
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that 
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of 
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression 
and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified 
by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that 
date and whether published or unpublished, are governed 
exclusively by this title.  Thereafter, no person is entitled to 
any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the 
common law or statutes of any State.16 
  
Thus, except for works not yet fixed,17 federal jurisdiction, both civil and 
criminal, is exclusive.  
 The Supreme Court, in Dowling, recounts the history of the latter 
through 1985.18  There, defendant had been convicted of selling unauthorized 
recordings of music that, itself, was covered by copyright.19  Yet “Congress 
did not extend federal copyright protection to sound recordings until the 
Sound Recording Act of 1971, and then only to sound recordings fixed after 
February 15, 1972.  Therefore, most of the sound recordings involved in this 
case, as opposed to the musical compositions performed, are apparently not 
protected by copyright.”20 
 After being convicted under the FCA,21 the NSPA,22 and the mail fraud 
                                            
 15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.0(6) (2011) (“‘property’ means anything of value, including real estate, 
tangible and intangible personal property . . . .”). 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (West 2012). 
 17. See id. § 1101(d) (no preemption of state jurisdiction over rights in live musical performances). 
 18. Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 218–21 (1985). 
 19. Id. at 208–09. 
 20. Id. at 211 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1976).  
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (West 2012). 
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statute,23 “Dowling appealed from all the convictions save those for 
copyright infringement, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed in all respects.”24  The Court, however, considers only the 
NSPA25 “to resolve an apparent conflict among the Circuits concerning the 
application of the statute to interstate shipments of bootleg and pirated sound 
recordings”26 where the stolen property consisted of copyright only.27 
 Dowling begins by observing that copyrights are not ordinary chattels: 
“The infringer invades a statutorily defined province . . . .  But he does not 
assume physical control over the copyright; nor does he wholly deprive its 
owner of its use.”28  Turning to the NSPA itself, the Court concludes, 
following careful analysis of little interest here, that liability based on its 
language and origins is inappropriate.29  
 The Court then states: 
 
 The history of copyright infringement provisions affords 
additional reason to hesitate . . . .  Not only has Congress 
chiefly relied on an array of civil remedies to provide 
copyright holders protection against infringement, but in 
exercising its power to render criminal certain forms of 
copyright infringement, it has acted with exceeding caution.30 
 
Indeed, because the unauthorized sale of recordings in question occurred in 
1979, the FCA did not cover them as such.31  
 After exploring that history at length, it notes: 
 
 The broad consequences of the Government’s theory . . . 
provide a final and dispositive factor against reading [the 
NSPA] in the manner suggested.  For example, in Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 
(1985), this Court very recently held that The Nation, a weekly 
magazine of political commentary, had infringed former 
President Ford's copyright in the unpublished manuscript of his 
memoirs by verbatim excerpting of some 300 words from the 
                                            
 23. Id. § 1341 (mail fraud). 
 24. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 212. 
 25. See id. at 209 n.1. 
 26. Id. at 213 (footnote omitted). 
 27. See id. at 211 n.4 (“[T]he § 2314 counts rely solely on infringement of copyrights to musical 
compositions.”). 
 28. Id. at 216–17. 
 29. Id. at 217–18, 221. 
 30. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 221 (citations omitted). 
 31. See id. at 224 (recounting events leading up to the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 
1982). 
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work. . . .  [W]e would pause, in the absence of any explicit 
indication of congressional intention, to bring such conduct 
within the purview of a criminal statute making available 
serious penalties for the interstate transportation of goods 
“stolen, converted or taken by fraud.”32 
  
 Moreover, as Dowling finds, “the field of copyright does not cabin the 
Government’s theory, which would as easily encompass the law of patents 
and other forms of intellectual property. . . .  Thus . . . its view of the statute 
would readily permit its application to interstate shipments of patent-
infringing goods.”33  In the same vein, it mentions trademarks.34 
 Until 1999,35 the FCA penalized only infringement “for purposes of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain.”36  With generic liability off 
the table, it became clear ten years later that even the most egregious private 
malefactors were immune from prosecution absent personal gain.37  Thus, the 
portion of the statute most relevant here was amended to read: 
 
(1) In general.— Any person who willfully infringes a 
copyright shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of 
title 18, if the infringement was committed— 
 (A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private 
financial gain; 
 (B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by 
electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more 
copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which 
have a total retail value of more than $1,000[.]38 
  
 It might seem a stretch to apply copyright law to documents such as the 
papal papers, ones not intended for public exposure, much less reproduction 
                                            
 32. Id. at 226 (quoting the NSPA). 
 33. Id. at 226–27.  No penal statute covers patent infringement; the only penalty applicable to patents is 
35 U.S.C. § 292(a), amended by § 16(b) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 
125 Stat. 284 (2011) (false marking). 
 34. Dowling, 473 U.S. at 227 n.20.  Only trademark counterfeiting (a narrow subset of trademark 
infringement) carries federal criminal penalties.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2320.  It may also carry state criminal 
penalties. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sow, 860 A.2d 154, 154–55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding that 
federal law does not preempt the state’s ability to prosecute for trademark counterfeiting). 
 35. See generally Ting Ting Wu, The New Criminal Copyright Sanctions: A Toothless Tiger?, 39 IDEA: 
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 527 (1999) (explaining the significance of the 1999 change 
in the law).  
 36. See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 223. 
 37. See U.S. v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536, 545 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (West 2012). 
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and sale, but religious organizations have, indeed, obtained relief in similar 
circumstances.39  Although copies neither intended for sale, nor sold, have no 
“retail” value in the hands of owners, the value to transferees would be 
expected to satisfy the requirement. 
 
B. Trade Secrets 
  
 Although federal law provides no civil cause of action for trade secret 
misappropriation, prosecutors may seek penalties under the EEA.40  Unless 
theft serves foreign interests,41 however, stolen secrets must be “related to or 
included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”42  That would cover most trade secret theft, but a recent case 
involving a former employee of Goldman Sachs & Company (“Goldman”) 
illuminates a serious gap.43 
 After Sergey Aleynikov, a former Goldman employee, was indicted for 
theft of trade secrets in violation of the EEA, transporting stolen property in 
violation of NSPA, and unauthorized computer access under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act,44 he moved to dismiss each of these counts.45  
 Aleynikov prevailed on the third because, although access was abused, 
the government conceded that it was authorized.46  He was subsequently 
convicted under the NSPA and EEA for theft of proprietary computer source 
code,47 but the Second Circuit reversed both.48 
 The NSPA conviction was reversed based in part on U.S. v. Bottone,49 a 
Second Circuit opinion that upholds a conviction under the NSPA despite the 
fact that, as claimed in the Vatican case,50 purloined media were copies, not 
originals.51  The force of that part of the case is, however, weakened because 
                                            
 39. See, e.g., Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1291, 
1295 (D. Ut. 1999) (halting links to a handbook); see also, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line 
Commc’n. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1239, 1258 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (copyright claim failed for 
different reasons). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (West 2012). 
 41. See id. § 1831(a). 
 42. Id. § 1832(a). 
 43. See generally Aleynikov III, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), 1030(c)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) (West 2012)  As many will recall, an indictment 
under this statute recently led Aaron Swartz, an internet pioneer, to commit suicide sparking calls for 
amendment. See, e.g., Suzanne Choney, ‘Aaron’s Law’ to honor Internet activist, redefine computer 
fraud, NBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/technolog/aarons-law-honor-
internet-activist-redefine-computer-fraud-1B8005442 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 45. U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov I), 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 175–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 46. Id. at 194. 
 47. U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov II), 785 F. Supp. 2d 46, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 48. Aleynikov III, 676 F.3d at 73. 
 49. 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 50. See Winfield, supra note 2. 
 51. See Bottone, 365 F.2d at 393. 
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the stolen cultures of microorganisms that clearly qualified as goods also 
moved in commerce, indeed, to Italy.52  Although the jury had not been asked 
to determine whether the cultures as well as the photocopies and the like had 
met the $5000 statutory threshold,53 the court seems to believe that it would 
have so found if asked.  Moreover, it dismisses the significance of the 
threshold, saying: 
 
 “The only reason for the $5,000 limitation is to avoid 
overtaxing the Department of Justice.  There is no legitimate 
interest of (defendants) . . . which the Congress sought to 
protect by this requirement.” 
 We have not the slightest question that the jury would 
have properly convicted on all counts if only the transportation 
of cultures had been charged, and the papers had been relied 
on simply as demonstrating the scope of the criminal enterprise 
and as enhancing the value of the microorganisms.54 
 
That aside, Bottone says, “where no tangible objects were ever taken or 
transported, a court would be hard pressed to conclude that ‘goods’ had been 
stolen and transported within the meaning of 2314.”55 
 Because Aleynikov took no media, the court echoes Bottone and 
concludes, “[s]ome tangible property must be taken from the owner for there 
to be deemed a ‘good’ that is ‘stolen’ for purposes of the NSPA.”56  
Moreover, that “reading of the NSPA is confirmed by the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Dowling.”57  Applying Dowling’s logic, if not its holding,58 the 
Second Circuit therefore joins other Circuits to find theft of trade secrets 
outside the ambit of the NSPA.59 
 The EEA conviction was reversed, too, because “Goldman's [high-
frequency trading] system was neither ‘produced for’ nor ‘placed in’ 
interstate or foreign commerce.  Goldman had no intention of selling its HFT 
system or licensing it to anyone.”60 
 It is difficult to imagine why Goldman’s computer source code was not 
                                            
 52. See id. at 392.  
 53. See id. at 394. 
 54. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Schaffer, 266 F.2d 435, 440 (2d Cir. 1959), aff'd, 362 U.S. 511 (1960)). 
 55. U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov III), 676 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bottone, 365 F.2d at 
393). 
 56. Aleynikov III, 676 F.3d at 77. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 77 n.4. 
 59. See id. at 77–78 (citing 10th, 7th, and 1st Circuit cases). 
 60. Id. at 82 (citing a district court opinion and quoting § 2413). 
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also covered by copyright.61  It, therefore, seems remarkable that Aleynikov 
was not also indicted under FCA § 506(a)(1).62  Given that the jury found 
Aleynikov guilty of violating the NSPA and the EEA,63 it is hard to believe 
that it would not also have found that Goldman’s code was taken for “private 
financial gain” as forbidden by § 506(a)(1)(A).  If so, conviction would have 
warranted imprisonment for up to ten years.64 
 The problem revealed by Aleynikov has since been addressed “by striking 
‘or included in a product that is produced for or placed in’ and inserting ‘a 
product or service used in or intended for use in’” in § 1832(a) of the EEA.65   
It is remarkable that substituted language does not read, for example, “a 
product or service used in or intended for a use that affects.”66  Thus, the 
amendment seems not to go far enough.67  
 In any event, information of the type misappropriated at the Vatican 
could now be covered by the EEA despite its being unrelated to any product.  
Nor would the value threshold noted in Bottone present a problem.68  
Possibly for reasons mentioned there,69 no value threshold appears in the 
EEA’s definition of trade secret70 or in sections spelling out forbidden 
conduct.71  Such information would nevertheless be difficult to fit within the 
EEA’s trade secret definition.72 
                                            
 61. See, e.g., Syntek Semiconductor Co., Ltd. V. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 779, 782–83 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
 62. The district court mentions that Aleynikov was “charged in a three count indictment,” but he was 
tried on only two of the courts. U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov II), 785 F. Supp. 2d 46, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
The term, “copyright” appears repeatedly in that opinion, but no reference is found to the FCA. 
 63. Aleynikov III, 676 F.3d at 73. 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(2) (West 2012). 
 65. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, 126 Stat. 1627 (2012). 
 66. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (West 2012) with 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (West 2012) (trademark 
counterfeiting).  The latter makes no reference to commerce, but Lanham Act § 45, 15 USC § 1127, says, 
“‘commerce’ means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127 
(West 2012).  It is difficult to understand why an equivalent view of commerce would be inappropriate for 
federal trade secret legislation. 
 67. See Peter J. Toren, An Analysis of Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions: What Companies Can 
Learn From It and What the Government Should Be Doing About It!, 84 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 
J. 884 (Bloomberg BNA, Sep. 21, 2012); see also Peter Toren, Criminal Trade Secret, PETERTOREN.COM, 
http://petertoren.com/criminal-trade-secret/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2012) (“I was involved in the drafting of 
the EEA as a trial attorney with Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section of the United States 
Department of Justice.  Further, the legislative history of the EEA cited a law review article of mine that 
advocated for a federal criminal trade secrets law.”).  The article referenced in the quotation is not cited on 
the web page, but it is Peter J.G. Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Thefts under Federal Law, 22 
PEPP. L. REV. 59, 96–98 (1994), and is discussed in Part III(A) below. 
 68. See U.S. v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 394 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting U.S. v. Schaffer, 266 F.2d 435, 440 
(2d Cir. 1959), aff'd, 362 U.S. 511 (1960). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (West 2012). 
 71. See id. § 1831 (prohibited conduct that benefits foreign entities); and see id. § 1832 (prohibited 
conduct that benefits anyone other than owners). 
 72. As defined by § 1839(3), the term is limited to “financial, business, scientific, technical, economic 
or engineering information.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (West 2012). 




III. STATE LAW 
A. Generally 
  
 State prosecution for copyright infringement is barred because state 
action to vindicate “legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright” is preempted.73 
 Aleynikov’s prosecution for theft under the EEA failed in part for lack of 
a product “produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce.”74  
Despite that limitation, he could have been prosecuted under the law of 
several states, and, he is, in fact being prosecuted under New York state 
law.75 
 It also warrants mention that preemptive limits on state jurisdiction have 
extended beyond copyrights since 1964, when a pair of cases suggested that 
any state’s prohibition of copying unpatented goods would be preempted by 
federal patent laws.76  Not until the Kewanee decision in 1974 did it become 
clear that state trade secret jurisdiction is not barred.77 Indeed, as Justice 
Marshall writes: 
  
 Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the possibility that 
an inventor with a patentable invention will rely on state 
trade secret law rather than apply for a patent is “remote 
indeed. . . .”  I have no doubt that the existence of trade 
secret protection provides in some instances a substantial 
disincentive to entrance into the patent system . . . .  
 . . . State trade secret laws and the federal patent laws 
have co-existed for many, many years.  During this time, 
Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its full awareness of 
the existence of the trade secret system . . . . Indeed, 
Congress has in a number of instances given explicit federal 
protection to trade secret information provided to federal 
                                            
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (West 2012). 
 74. See U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov III), 676 F.3d 71, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2012) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1832(a) (West 2012) in light of equivalent language in 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (West 2012)). 
 75. See Brian Mahoney, Ex-Goldman Coder Can’t Collect $2.4M in Attys’ Fees Yet, LAW360 (Dec. 18, 
2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/402298 (“Aleynikov was arrested again in August and indicted by 
a New York State grand jury for offenses related to the alleged theft.”). 
 76. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (holding that “if the design is not entitled to a design patent or 
other federal statutory protection, then it can be copied at will”). 
 77. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974). 




Limits nevertheless remain.  Perhaps the most significant is Kewanee’s 
observation that trade secret law “does not offer protection against discovery 
by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental 
disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering.”79 Potentially most 
significant is the suggestion that states could not, should they so desire, 
penalize someone who accidentally obtained a secret. 
 In support of a recommendation that appears to have led to creation of 
the EEA,80 Peter Toren found that prosecuting trade secret theft to be 
difficult in thirty states.81  When he wrote, only eight explicitly forbade it.82 
Perhaps following the Model Penal Code,83 twelve states explicitly forbade 
theft of intangible property.84  Toren, therefore, regarded conviction in the 
remaining thirty as problematic absent theft of something tangible.85 Even 
among states that enable prosecution for trade secret theft, reported opinions 
are rare.86  For example, none have been found outside of California, Florida, 
                                            
 78. Id. at 493–94 (Marshall, J., concurring).  Subsequent enactment of the EEA certainly reinforces his 
view. 
 79. Id. at 476. 
 80. See Toren, supra note 14, at 96–98. 
 81. Id. at 95 n.257 (providing a list of states).  Updating that list has proven difficult.  BLOOMBERG 
LAW, CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES PORTFOLIO 43-3D: TRADE SECRETS: PROTECTION AND REMEDIES, 
TRADE SECRETS, WORKSHEET 12 STATE STATUTES IMPOSING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR TRADE SECRET 
MISAPPROPRIATION, available at http://www.bloomberglaw.com (listing 19 states);  MELVIN F. JAGER, 1 
TRADE SECRETS LAW § 4:4 n.16 (2012) (listing 24 states). None of those lists, however, contain UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-401(1) (2012), which includes, among property interests protected by the Utah 
Criminal Code, “trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical information, 
design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the owner thereof intends to be available only to 
persons selected by him.”  
 82. Id. at 95 n.251. 
 83. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 223.0(6) (American Law Institute) (Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1980) (“‘property’ means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and 
intangible personal property . . . .”). 
 84. Toren, supra note 14, at 95 n.251. 
 85. Id. at 94–95; see, e.g., Jun Yang, Kyunghee Park, The Curious Case of Samsung’s Missing TVs, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ME9QGN3HBS3K (“While it would be difficult to reverse-
engineer the fundamentals of OLED technology from the missing televisions, simply understanding how 
Samsung packed the parts inside the superthin sets would be valuable information for thieves.”). 
 86. This is also true of state civil cases because the opinions of state trial courts are infrequently 
reported.  See, e.g., David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State 
Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 59 (2011); see also, David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade 
Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 292 (2010) (“The theft of trade secrets is also 
big business, costing companies as much as $300 billion per year.”).  This, no doubt, accounts for the 
exponential growth of trade secret litigation in federal courts.  “[T]rade secret cases doubled in the seven 
years from 1988 to 1995, and doubled again in the nine years from 1995 to 2004. At the projected rate, 
trade secret cases will double again by 2017.”  Id. at 293 (footnotes omitted). 
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Georgia, and Texas within the past three decades.87 
 Before theft of “trade secrets” can be penalized, the term must be 
defined.  In the context of private torts, its definition has been relatively 
uniform since 1939:  “A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, 
device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and 
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who 
do not know or use it.”88 
 As noted in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, “Some early 
cases elevated use by the trade secret owner to independent significance.”89  
Now, however, “Use by the person asserting rights in the information is not a 
prerequisite to [trade secret] protection.”90  That view is also reflected in the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)91 and the EEA.92 Most states have 
adopted the UTSA,93 but nothing equivalent exists for state prosecution of 
theft of intangibles, even when trade secrets are referenced explicitly. 
 Three opinions are considered below in chronological order.  They seem 
ample to illustrate important problems that would be faced by state courts in 
dealing with situations similar to those illustrated by Aleynikov,94 or the 
Vatican controversy.95 Moreover, unlike most of the few cases that have been 
found,96 the highest courts in the state issued the first and third opinions. 
 
                                            
 87. A Westlaw query (da(aft 1/1/1982) & “trade secret” & indict! convict! /s criminal, theft, steal, 
stolen in ALLSTATES database) yielded roughly a dozen relevant opinions among many results.  Such a 
search would not, however, pick up prosecutions for theft of tangibles such as those discussed supra note 
84. 
 88. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939) (emphasis added). 
 89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (1995). 
 90. Id. 
 91. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (Nat’l Conference on Uniform State Laws) (1985) 
(protecting information that “derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known” (emphasis added)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION  § 39 
(defining a trade secret as “any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other 
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage 
over others” (emphasis added)). 
 92. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (1996) (protects information that “derives independent economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known” (emphasis added)).  But note that § 1832(a), 
quoted supra note 41, differs in that respect. 
 93. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, SELECTED STATUTES AND INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS ON PATENT, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK, AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 28–29 (2012) (listing 
48 states and other U.S. jurisdictions that have adopted the Act).  Delaware is apparently the only state to 
incorporate by reference the UTSA definition in its criminal code.  See DEL. CODE ANN. 11, § 857(9). 
 94. See U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov III), 676 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 95. See Winfield, supra note 2. 
 96. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 




 On facts similar to those in Dowling,98 Yourawski was prosecuted for 
larceny where the property in question was a motion picture on media not 
itself stolen.99  Refusing to follow pre-Dowling federal opinions where such 
action was found within the scope of NSPA,100 the opinion holds: 
 
We do not read the definition of “property” in G.L. c. 266, § 
30(2), as reaching the property interest that is alleged to have 
been stolen in this case. Certainly, the images and sounds 
captured on the cassette tapes are not within any of the items 
specified in § 30(2). We have [sic not] treated § 30(2)’s 
definition of property as all-inclusive, apart from items that 
were subject to larceny at common law. Commonwealth v. 
Engleman, supra, 336 Mass. [66] at 69, 142 N.E.2d 406. Thus, 
we have not read the word “property” in § 30(2) as broadly as 
the Federal courts have read the words “goods, wares (and) 
merchandise” in § 2314. For example, United States v. 
Bottone, [365 F.2d] at 393-394, held an intangible trade secret 
to be within § 2314, whereas Commonwealth v. Engleman, 
supra, held that theft of a trade secret was not a violation of 
our larceny statute.101 
 
The court also points out that “the knowing receipt of stolen trade secrets” 
was added elsewhere in the statute in 1967.102 
 It warrants mention that the court says: 
 
In light of our conclusion that the intellectual property 
appearing on the cassette tapes is not property within the 
meaning of the definition appearing in G.L. c. 266, § 30(2), we 
need not consider the defendants’ further argument that the 
Commonwealth's power to regulate conduct of the type alleged 
in these indictments is preempted . . . .103 
                                            
 97. Commonwealth v. Yourawski, 425 N.E.2d 298 (Mass.1981). 
 98. See Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 211 n.4 (1985) (citations omitted).   
 99. Yourawski, 425 N.E.2d at 298–99.  
 100. One was U.S. v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1966), discussed above at notes 49–55. 
 101. Yourawski, 425 N.E.2d at 299.  It is clear in context that the third sentence omits a critical “not.” 
Id.; see also U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov III), 676 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2012) (showing that Bottone is 
read otherwise in Aleynikov III).  Moreover, any suggestion that Bottone might have countenanced 
convictions for record piracy under the NSPA is clearly overruled by Dowling.  See Dowling, 473 U.S. at 
218–22. 
 102. Yourawski, 425 N.E.2d at 299. 
 103. Id. at 300; see also id. n.4 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 301). 






 Taborsky, approving a revocation of probation, is the last in a series of 
opinions addressing the same events.105  Indeed, a related civil case offers 
useful information about the indictment:  “Taborsky [who took] laboratory 
notebooks containing proprietary and confidential research . . . was charged 
with . . . one count of second degree grand theft and . . . one count of theft of 
trade secrets.”106 
 On the trade secret count, he might have served five years;107 on the 
grand theft count, he might have served fifteen.108  In the opinions, no 
reference is found to anything tangible other than the notebooks, so the 
second count is apparently based on their being valued between $20,000 and 
$100,000.109 
 Following repeated refusals to return the notebooks,110 resulting in 
repeated revocations of probation, Taborsky was imprisoned.111  Although he 
served eighteen months,112 he might have served fifteen years, triple the 
penalty for theft of secrets that overwhelming comprised the value of the 
notebooks.113  Dowling, for example, seems to stand for the proposition that, 
when two provisions might apply, the specific should prevail over the 
general.114  If the Florida legislature believed that a particular penalty should 
apply to a given crime, why would it regard a larger penalty as appropriate 
                                            
 104. Taborsky v. State, 659 So.2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
 105. Id. at 1113. 
 106. Regents v. Taborsky, 648 So.2d 748, 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
 107. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.081(3) (“Any person who . . . steals or embezzles an article 
representing a trade secret . . . is guilty of a felony of the third degree.”); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 775.082(d) (felony of the third degree punishable by “by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 
years”). 
 108. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.014(2)(b)(1) (stealing property valued between $20,000 and $100,000 
is a felony of the second degree); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(c) (felony of the third degree 
punishable by “by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 15 years”). 
 109. Taborsky, 648 So.2d at 749–50. 
 110. Had Taborsky returned the notebooks, it would have made no difference under the Florida trade 
secret statute.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.081(3) (“In a prosecution for a violation of the provisions of 
this section, it is no defense that the person so charged returned or intended to return the article so stolen, 
embezzled, or copied.”). 
 111. Taborsky v. State, 659 So.2d 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
 112. See IP Advocate, Taborsky Case Study: Wastewater Treatment, available at 
http://www.ipadvocate.org/studies/taborsky/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2012) (“[Taborsky] was behind bars for 
a year and a half, four months of which were in a maximum security facility and two months of that on a 
chain gang.  After his release in April 1997, [Taborsky] continued to pursue the overturn of his 
conviction.”).  This is only one of many accounts found by searching for “Petr Taborsky.” 
 113. See supra notes 108–10.  
 114. See Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207 (1985).  
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 The facts in the final case considered here most resemble those at issue 
in the Vatican.116  As the opinion recounts: 
 
In early 2001, the defendant entered his tenants' apartment with 
their permission to install a ceiling fan.  When the couple left, 
the defendant entered their bedroom and, without permission, 
took possession of several intimate photographs of the female 
tenant, which he found on top of a dresser.  He brought the 
pictures to his nearby apartment, scanned them into his 
computer, and then returned them to their original location.  
Several months later, the tenants learned of the defendant's 
actions and reported the matter to the police. The defendant 
admitted what he had done when the police confronted him.117 
  
 As also related in the opinion, Nelson, in his appeal following conviction 
for receiving stolen property, argues that “the computer-scanned 
photographic images generated from the original photographs are not 
‘property’ within the meaning of the theft chapter.”118  Additionally, “[h]e 
further contends that the State’s evidence, as a matter of law, did not 
establish either that the images he retained on his computer constituted 
‘property of another,’ or that he had a ‘purpose to deprive’ the owner of the 
photographic images.”119 
 Rejecting Nelson’s argument that holding the images on his computer 
did not amount to receipt of stolen property,120 the court turns to the statutory 
definition of property underlying such penalties.121  As stated there, 
“property” covers “anything of value, including . . . intangible personal 
property,” as well as services, and trade secrets.122 The court then concludes 
on a point highly relevant here: 
 
Integral to ownership . . . is the right to exclude others from 
possessing, using and enjoying a particular item of property.  
                                            
 115. State  v. Nelson, 842 A.2d 83 (N.H. 2004) 
 116. See Winfield, supra note 2.  
 117. Nelson, 842 A.2d at 84. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 637.7(I) (1986). 
 121. Nelson, 842 A.2d at 84–85. 
 122. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 637.2 (1996). 
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Thus, the owner of the photographs at issue had the right to 
select who would have access to view them.  Though the 
defendant returned the original photographs, he kept a computer 
reproduction of the captured images, without permission, and it 
is these images he was convicted of unlawfully retaining. 
Therefore, the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law . . . .123 
  
Nelson’s attorney did not argue that theft of such images may only be 
prosecuted under the FCA.124  Indeed, had federal prosecution been 
attempted, the need to demonstrate that the stolen images had a retail value 
exceeding $1000 could have presented serious difficulty.125 
 In any event, had preemption been argued, that too might have failed.  
Insofar as information in the photographs was apparently not intended for 
public viewing, it might as readily fall within the realm of trade secrets as 
copyrights.  If so, state jurisdiction would not be defeated by federal 
preemption. 
 
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
 Since January 1, 1978, copyright in documents, published or 
unpublished, is exclusively a matter of federal law.126  After Dowling,127 
federal prosecutions based on generic penal statutes seem unlikely except for 
theft of media that happens to contain copyrighted subject matter.128  Nor, in 
                                            
 123. Nelson, 842 A.2d at 86. 
 124. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.  
 125. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B); supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.  It might seem strange 
that preemption was not argued, but two other related statutes may have led the attorney astray.  The first, 
enacted in 1895, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352:1, reads as follows: 
Whenever any person, firm, association or corporation is the owner of any literary, 
dramatic or musical composition and the rights of the author pertaining thereto, and such 
composition has not been copyrighted, printed or published, or of any map, charter, 
engraving, cut, print, photograph or negative thereof, statue, statuary, model or design, 
which has not been copyrighted or offered for sale, it shall be unlawful for any other 
person to publish, produce, print, or sell or offer to sell the same without first obtaining the 
consent of the owner thereof. 
The other, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352:2, reads, “Whoever violates RSA 352:1 shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”  Those statutes do not facially cover photographic images, which is not surprising in light 
of their age, but they may not have been seen to offer any comparative advantage. 
 126. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 127. Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 220 (1985) (“Congress acted under its commerce power to assist 
the States’ efforts to foil the ‘roving criminal,’ whose movement across state lines stymied local law 
enforcement officials . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 128. See id. at 214 (“[T]he Government does not suggest that Dowling wrongfully came by the 
phonorecords actually shipped or the physical materials from which they were made.”).  
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the latter instance, would anything seem to bar state prosecution.129 
 Since 1996, federal prosecution for theft of trade secrets has been 
possible under the EEA.130  As mentioned above, the facts of Aleynikov131 
illustrate how prosecution under that act could easily overlap with 
prosecution under the FCA.132  Why the latter was not pursued is a 
mystery.133  In any event, prosecution under both the NSPA and the EEA 
failed because no goods were involved.134  The latter failure appears to have 
resulted from an inadvertent legislative gap apt now closed.135 
 States clearly may prosecute those who steal goods,136 but prosecution 
for theft of intangibles has long been based on an assortment of statutes,137 at 
least one of which is preempted.138  Published copyrightable subject matter is 
beyond the reach of state law, civil or penal, but little other than individual 
state’s statutory limits139 prevents the theft of unpublished information that 
might qualify as a trade secret.140 
 Roughly half of the states penalize theft of trade secrets specifically,141 
but those that do offer definitions may be difficult to reconcile with 
intangible property such as was stolen in the Vatican case.142  With regard to 
that, one opinion finds, “at least some precedent for granting trade secret 
status to works that are techniques for improving oneself (though not 
specifically spiritually). Conversely, there is no authority for excluding 
religious materials from trade secret protection because of their nature.”143  
That opinion, however, concerns a civil dispute, giving cause to wonder 
whether courts would resolve the issue the same way in a criminal case.144 
                                            
 129. See id. at 220 (noting that the NSPA was intended to supplement, not supplant state jurisdiction). 
 130. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (1996); supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.  
 131. See U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov I), 737 F. Supp. 2d 173, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); supra note 45 and 
accompanying text.  
 132. See U.S. v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 133. See generally id. 
 134. See U.S. v. Aleynikov (Aleynikov III), 676 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2012); supra note 55 and 
accompanying text.  
 135. See Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236 (2012); supra notes 65–
67 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 220 (1985) (noting that the NSPA intended to supplement, not 
supplant state jurisdiction). 
 137. See supra notes 81–87 and accompanying text. 
 138. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 352:1, 2 which is preempted by 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); supra note 125 
and accompanying text. 
 139. See also Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476; supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 140. C.f. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40(b)(4) (1995) (suggesting that one might 
be forbidden to use materials acquired as a result of “accident or mistake”).  That is unlikely to come into 
play, however, unless accidental acquisition are regarded as made by “theft.” 
 141. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Winfield, supra note 2. 
 143. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n. Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1252 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) (applying a version of the UTSA). 
 144. But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 857 (providing for use of the definition in that state’s version of 
the UTSA). 
2013 INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 187 
 
 
 Many states penalize theft of “intangible personal property,”145 but no 
state definitions of that term have been found.146 What might it cover other 
than information akin to trade secrets, possibly including non-economic as 
well as economic interests?  Must it be alienable?  Does it include domain 
names that are alienable?147  Does it include trademark-related interests 
alienable but only when included with the sale of a related business?148  What 
of rights of publicity?149 
 In that respect, the facts in Nelson150 press the limits of intangible 
property interests subject to state penal control.  One might wonder how the 
New Hampshire court might have responded if copyright preemption been 
called to its attention.151  It seems even more of a stretch than with some 
religious documents152 to regard the contents of the photographs in issue as 
“trade secrets.”153 
 Privacy seems to have been the victim’s central interest in Nelson,154 and 
possibly also in the Vatican case.155  It seems highly inappropriate to regard 
an invasion of privacy as theft of property. 156 
 Such issues seem ripe for careful legislative attention.  Having that in 
mind, courts should consider such matters as whether a legislature would set, 
for whatever reason, the penalty for theft of trade secrets at five years, if it 
intended that the simultaneous theft of otherwise valueless media would 
warrant a fifteen year sentence.157 
                                            
 145. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 146. That issue was central, however, in Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 
(D.N.H. 2008).  Details are of no consequence here, but the court found that “intellectual property” 
covered a violation of the right of publicity but not an invasion of a right of privacy because the latter is 
“a personal right, peculiar to the individual . . . which cannot be transferred like other property 
interests.”  Id. at 302–03 (citations omitted). 
 147. See, e.g., § 43(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV) (making a 
domain name registrant’s intention to assign rather than use it one of several indicia of bad faith 
registration, or “cyberpiracy”). 
 148. See, e.g., Lanham Act § 10(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1). 
 149. See Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 288. 
 150. See State v. Nelson, 842 A.2d 83, 84 (N.H. 2004); supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 151. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 352.1-2; supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n. Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 
1995); supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Nelson, 842 A.2d at 84. 
 154. See id. at 86; supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Winfield, supra note 2. 
 156. See supra note 133.  
 157. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.081(3); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.014(2); Regents v. Taborsky, 648 
So.2d 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text; see also Dowling v. 
U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1985): 
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 This paper only scratches the surface, but it should support the ultimate 
conclusion that much remains to be done at the state level if penalties are to 
be imposed, as well they should be, for crimes involving trade secrets and 
other intangible property.158  If, as this author expects, it would foster better 
understanding and bring more state resources to bear on increasingly 
important criminal activity159 something in the nature of a penal UTSA might 
result in more state prosecutions.160 
 
                                                                                                       
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than 
construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; 
and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the 
judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain 
its punishment. (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (1820)). 
 158. See Winfield, supra note 2. 
 159. See Yang, supra note 85 (“[T]he FBI says its pending caseload of espionage cases represents losses 
to the American economy of more than $13 billion this fiscal year.”).  It seems likely that many cases are 
too small to warrant federal attention. 
 160. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 857(9). 
 
